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 Progression paths in children’s problem solving:  
The influence of dynamic testing, initial variability and working-memory 
 
Abstract  
The current study investigated developmental trajectories of analogical reasoning performance of 
104 7-to-8-year-old children. We employed a microgenetic research method and multilevel 
analysis to examine the influence of several background variables and experimental treatment on 
the children’s developmental trajectories. Our participants were divided into two treatment 
groups: repeated practice alone and repeated practice with training. Each child received an initial 
working-memory assessment, and was subsequently asked to solve figural analogies on each of 
several sessions. We examined children’s analogical problem-solving behavior and their 
subsequent verbal accounts of their employed solving processes. We also investigated the 
influence of verbal and visual-spatial working-memory capacity and initial variability in strategy-
use on analogical reasoning development. Results indicated that children in both treatment groups 
improved but gains were greater for those who had received training. Training also reduced the 
influence of children’s initial variability in the use of analogical strategies with the degree of 
improvement in reasoning largely unrelated to working memory capacity. Findings from this 
study demonstrate the value of a microgenetic research method and the use of multilevel analysis 
to examine inter- and intra-individual change in problem-solving processes.  
 
Keywords Dynamic testing; Microgenetic; Figural analogies; Inductive reasoning; Working 
memory; Multilevel analysis 
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Progression paths in children’s problem solving:  
The influence of dynamic testing, initial variability and working-memory 
 
 Introduction  
Fine-grained investigation of children’s cognitive abilities, including the influence of 
training, is complex, and children’s performance on reasoning and problem solving tasks has 
proven significantly more variable over time than many researchers and practitioners had 
assumed (Bjorklund & Rosenblum, 2001; Siegler, 2007). Substantial variability in solving 
cognitive tasks, between and within participants, has been demonstrated in a variety of domains, 
such as math, spelling and problem solving (Siegler, 1996). Studying this variability could 
provide us with more insights in how children determine the best ways of solving tasks. This 
approach may also help us gain a greater understanding of individual differences in the 
development of strategy-use over time and with increasing experience (Siegler, 2006).  
Our study sought to examine variability in children’s strategic behavior in analogy 
solving when receiving either a series of unguided practice sessions alone or this in combination 
with a training procedure derived from dynamic testing. We also studied the possible influence of 
working memory differences on analogy performance, as a differential relationship between 
working memory and analogical reasoning has been found for children trained in dynamic testing 
settings (e.g., Stevenson, Bergwerff, Heiser, & Resing, 2014; Swanson, 1994; 2011). The main 
focus of our study was therefore on ‘the rate of change’ and ‘variability’ dimensions of Siegler’s 
(1996) ‘overlapping waves’ theory. 
Inductive reasoning tasks, such as classification, analogies or series completion, all require 
comparable underlying problem-solving processes: starting with specific observations of the task 
details under consideration, and identification of a rule that leads to the solution must be detected 
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and formulated. This rule finding process can be reached by means of systematic comparison 
processes, which involve finding similarities and/or differences between task attributes and/or 
relations among attributes (Holyoak & Nisbett, 1988; Klauer & Phye, 2008; Perret, 2015). 
Analogical reasoning involves a basic inductive process that plays an important role in a number 
of higher cognitive processes (Halford, 1993; Morrison et al., 2004; Richland & Simms, 2015). In 
analogical studies, base items (for example, white: black) and targets (for example, snow: ??) 
domain have to be compared in order to find and formulate a relational correspondence existing 
between them (e.g., Holyoak, 2012, Thibaut & French, 2016).  
The development of analogical reasoning in children and its role in instruction and 
classroom learning have been the focus of much research (Csapó, 1997; Goswami, 2002; Klauer 
& Phye, 2008; Kolodner, 1997; Richland, Morrison, & Holyoak, 2006; Richland & Simms, 2015; 
Singer-Freeman, 2005; Vosniadou, 1989). The development and training of children’s ability to 
reason by analogy have also been studied extensively (Alexander et al., 1989; Alexander, 
Willson, White, & Fuqua, 1987; Goswami, 2013). In most studies, children older than 6 years 
have displayed clear improvements in analogical reasoning after receiving a (brief) period of 
training or, alternatively, after having been given extensive instructions or training for, for 
example, verbal analogies (Resing, 2000), physical problem analogies (Tunteler & Resing, 2007), 
concrete pictorial analogies (Hessels-Schlatter, 2002;Stevenson, Resing, & Froma, 2009), and 
classic geometric analogies (Hosenfeld, Van der Maas, & Van den Boom, 1997; Tunteler, Pronk, 
& Resing, 2008). In contrast, younger children have tended only to show such gains when they 
had received extensive training (Alexander et al., 1989; Tunteler & Resing, 2007).  
Studies focusing on the development of inductive (analogical) reasoning have often 
utilized cross-sectional designs (e.g., Chen, 1996; Chen & Daehler, 1989; Richland et al.,  2006; 
Singer-Freeman, 2005; Thibout, French, & Vezneva, 2010). However, these are likely to provide 
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an incomplete picture of the dynamics of variability and change (e.g., Granott, 2002; Kuhn, 1995, 
2002; Siegler, 2006). Very few studies have compared changes in analogical reasoning over time 
which have been induced by repeated practice and/or training (e.g., Alexanderet al., 1989; 
Hosenfeld et al., 1997), a shortfall which the current study sought to address.  
One valuable approach to investigating learning trajectories is that which employs a 
microgenetic research design (Siegler, 2006; Winne & Nesbit, 2010). Such designs are 
characterized by frequently repeated (trial-by-trial) assessment sessions given within a relatively 
short period of time. They typically utilize somewhat basic instructions or unguided practice 
sessions, and typically yield highly frequent of observations relative to the rate of change. Hence, 
changes in reasoning can become visible closely to the moment they happen, thus enabling the 
discovery of natural developmental and learning trajectories. These trajectories may be 
considered natural if the practice sessions include no explicit forms of training, such as the 
provision of elaborate instructions or prompting (Flynn & Siegler, 2007; Siegler, 2006; Siegler & 
Crowley, 1991). In the present study we investigated whether problem solving trajectories 
involving analogy tasks showed differing pathways when these were acquired through more 
‘natural’ unprompted opportunities than when a short training procedure is included.  
 Dynamic testing, using a test-training-test format, has become increasingly used 
for the study of inductive reasoning (Bethge, Carlson, & Wiedl, 1982; Hessels-Schlatter, 2002;  
Resing & Elliott, 2011; Tzuriel & Flor-Maduel, 2010). Key to this approach is the incorporation 
of feedback and training during the testing phases (Elliott, Grigorenko, & Resing, 2010; 
Sternberg & Grigorenko, 2002). Conventional, static tests are considered to be a satisfactory 
means of assessing already developed abilities. In contrast, dynamic measures are designed to 
assess developing or yet-to-develop abilities which are the products of underlying, but often 
unrecognized, cognitive capacities (Elliott et al., 2010; Haywood & Lidz, 2007; Sternberg & 
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Grigorenko, 2006). Dynamic testing has been found to yield insights into strategies used by the 
examinee and their responsiveness to examiner assistance and support. In line with the pioneering 
studies of Campione, Brown, Ferrara, Jones & Steinberg (1985), we sought to examine children’s 
potential for learning in the domain of analogical reasoning. Our primary focus was on the 
number of prompts needed to solve the analogy items.  Here, the elements of the task that cannot 
be accomplished unassisted are controlled, with graduated standardized support given whenever 
the child is unable to make unaided progress.    
 In the current study we combined both dynamic and microgenetic methods of studying 
children’s development and learning. We examined whether a dynamic testing approach in 
combination with unguided practice, versus unguided practice alone, would result in different 
developmental trajectories in young children’s solving of analogy tasks.  
   The first few years of primary school are considered to be a period of rapid development 
of analogical reasoning ability (Siegler & Svetina, 2002), a time when high levels of intra-
individual variability in solving analogies are likely to be found. Siegler (2007), for example, 
posits that cognitive variability is an important variable in understanding, predicting, and 
describing the amount and type of cognitive change. He refers to cognitive variability as the 
differences between children in terms of change agents, growth trajectory, generalization, and 
speed of change, but also changes within the individual child’s repertoire of strategies. As a way 
to accurately assess variable strategy-use, Siegler (2007) stresses the value of trial-by-trial 
assessments focusing on the acquisition of new strategies, an increased usage of the most 
advanced strategies, increasingly efficient execution of strategies, and improved choices among 
strategies. In the current study, we employed a microgenetic, trial-by-trial assessment in order to 
investigate variability in children’s use of strategies when solving analogies and gauge their 
subsequent progress in their use of problem-solving strategies.  
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 In a microgenetic study of matrix completion, Siegler and Svetina (2002) found that the 
performance of 6-8 year old children improved considerably on a multiple choice matrix task as a 
result of repeated practice experiences. After discovery of the correct way of solving the tasks, 
children’s use of the improved strategy rapidly became dominant. However, patterns in strategy-
use may differ when items require the construction of a solution, rather than selection using a 
multiple-choice format. Tunteler et al. (2008) conducted a microgenetic study with 6-7-year-old 
children, using open-ended (constructed response) geometric analogies, behavioral and verbal 
outcome measures, and minimal instruction. Their results indicated that improvement in 
analogical reasoning often consisted of progression from incomplete to complete analogical 
answers. Children appeared to possess some rudimentary form of analogical reasoning skill that 
was accelerated by the opportunity to practice. After training, however, the children were largely 
able to explain their use of correct analogical strategies in solving the tasks. Further investigation 
revealed several subgroups of children that varied in the extent to which they could provide oral 
explanations of their approach to solving the problems (Tunteler et al., 2008). We sought to build 
on these findings in the current study by investigating both inter- and intra-individual paths of 
change by examining a) children’s behavioral strategies and b) their subsequent accounts of the 
procedures they had employed to tackle the problems.  
 An accumulating body of evidence suggests that working-memory capacity has a bearing 
upon the ability to solve complex reasoning tasks (Halford, Wilson, & Philips, 2010; Morrison et 
al., 2004; Primi, 2001). Many studies have explored the manner and extent to which inductive 
reasoning is related to working-memory capacity (Arendasy & Sommer, 2005; Engle, Tuholski, 
Laughlin, & Conway, 1999; Meo, Roberts, & Marucci, 2007; Richland et al., 2006; Viskontas, 
Morrison, Holyoak, Hummel, & Knowlton, 2004; Waltz, Lau, Grewal, & Holyoak, 2000). When 
solving analogies, children’s working memory appears to be particularly important for encoding 
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and processing the terms of the analogy (Sternberg & Rifkin, 1979). The type of relationship or 
task that needs to be managed appears to be influenced by the differential involvement of 
separate components of working memory. Various components have been investigated in a 
variety of inductive reasoning or academic tasks in different age groups (Alloway & Passolunghi, 
2011; Raghubar, Barnes, & Hecht, 2010). Age-related, differential involvement of these 
components in different types of tasks, were, among others, demonstrated by Alloway, 
Gathercole and Pickering (2006). They found that children as young as 4 years exhibit a 
structural organization of memory into both a domain-general component for processing 
information and verbal and visual-spatial domain-specific components for storage. In the present 
study, we focused on the potentially differential involvement of verbal and visual-spatial 
working-memory components in analogical reasoning development. This was a consequence of 
earlier research in dynamic testing which has reported that both visual-spatial and verbal 
reasoning components play a role in solving visual-spatial analogies. This is particularly apparent 
when, as part of the assessment, children are asked to explain their problem solving procedures 
(Stevenson, Heiser, & Resing, 2013; Tunteler et al., 2008). In the present study we explicitly 
focused on the differential involvement of verbal and visual-spatial working-memory 
components, to examine their possible role in respect of changes in analogical reasoning over 
time. We thought it important to examine these components separately with a working-memory 
assessment that made sufficient storage and processing demands (Alloway, 2007) and which 
would help us explore their influence on analogical reasoning (Resing, Xenidou-Dervou, Steijn & 
Elliott, 2012).  
Multi-level growth-curve analysis (e.g., Hox, 2010; see Method) enabled us to model the 
average growth trajectories of both groups of children and each child individually (Hox, 2010). 
Variability in strategy-use would be an important variable in predicting growth trajectories (see 
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also Siegler, 2007). We investigated systematic variation between these trajectories as a function 
of our background variables – the verbal and spatial working-memory components – and the 
experimental treatment [i.e. the dynamic test training procedure (Van der Leeden, 1998)]. In 
addition, our study also included initial variability in strategy-use as a potentially interesting 
background variable.  
In sum, the aim of the current study was to model the influence over time of a) repeated 
unguided practice, b) repeated unguided practice plus training derived from a dynamic testing 
procedure, c) verbal and visual-spatial working memory, and d) initial variability in problem-
solving procedures, on the problem-solving processes and individual outcome trajectories of 
young children. Using figural analogies tasks, we examined whether unguided practice with or 
without dynamic training would result in different changes in strategy-use and in performance 
accuracy. In addition, we anticipated that measures of working memory and initial variability in 
children’s problem solving would provide us with a richer understanding of factors underpinning 
individual growth trajectories in analogical reasoning. 
Firstly, we examined whether grade 2 children changed their approach to tackling figural 
analogy tasks on the basis of repeated unguided practice and having received, or not received, the 
dynamic testing intervention. The specific components measured were the children’s accuracy on 
the task, the use of various task-solution components as a measure of the (in)completeness of 
children’s performance on these tasks and their verbal explanations of their activity as a measure 
of the quality of their solving strategies (Tunteler & Resing, 2010). We hypothesized that a) 
repeated practice would lead children to independently adopt more advanced solution methods. 
However, we further hypothesized that b) trained children would make greater gains than those 
who received no such assistance (Resing et al., 2012; Siegler & Svetina, 2002).  
   
10 
 
Secondly, it was expected that spatial working-memory capacity would be related to 
figural analogical reasoning performance at the first session and also to improvement following 
repeated practice. Our reasoning for this was that children have to remember visuo-spatial 
information, for example, the position, size, color, and orientation of the various attributes of both 
the base and the target domains of the analogy in order to construct relational representations 
(Logie, Gilhooly, & Wynn, 1994; Rasmussen & Bisanz, 2005, Tunteler et al., 2008). Children 
with smaller spatial working-memory capacity were expected to make limited progress as a result 
of repeated practice as their workspace for constructing relational representations is assumed to 
be more limited (Halford et al., 2010). Those who had received training, however, were expected 
to subsequently demonstrate a higher rate of progress (Carr & Schneider, 1991; Halford et al., 
2010; Morrison, Doumas, & Richland, 2011). The rationale behind this hypothesis was that 
dynamic testing was expected to alleviate any working-memory limitation by breaking down the 
analogical reasoning process into small steps that can be processed serially and by providing 
relational knowledge (Halford et al., 2010; Morrison et al., 2011). This might help these children 
to catch up with peers with superior working-memory capacity. Children with larger spatial 
working-memory capacity, on the other hand, were expected to show a more gradual pattern and 
rate of change over time when receiving repeated practice alone, but nevertheless gain additional 
benefit from the training procedure (Tunteler & Resing, 2010).  
Thirdly, it was expected that the relationship between verbal working-memory capacity 
and performance on the figural analogies test would become less strong, both over time and after 
training on the grounds that our dynamic training procedure would reduce cognitive load 
(Alloway & Gathercole, 2006; Haavisto & Lehto, 2004; Halford et al., 1998, 2010; St. Claire-
Thompson & Gathercole, 2006).  
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Fourthly, we anticipated that variability in an individual’s strategy-use at the first session 
would be positively related to rate and amount of change in solving analogies, especially for the 
unguided practice sessions (Siegler, 2007). However, the progress of children receiving training 
in addition to repeated practice was expected to be less related to their initial performance as the 
assistance was intended to tap into underlying variability in potential rather than current, 
unassisted performance (Grigorenko, 2009). We therefore predicted that those children who 
displayed limited analogical reasoning before training would improve more rapidly than their 
peers, whereas higher performers before training would show a more gradual increase in the 
quality of their reasoning (Tunteler et al., 2008; Tunteler & Resing, 2007).  
Finally, the paths of change in children’s solving procedures were explored through 
inspection of the various group progression lines regarding the number of correctly solved 
analogies, the use of transformations, and their explanations of the approaches they adopted. We 
visually inspected how children [differentially] changed their solving procedures over sessions 
towards the use of more sophisticated problem-solving procedures (Siegler, 2006). The influence 
of children’s level of working memory, variable analogical solving skills at the start of the 
experiment, and training on this progression in solving procedures was further explored.  
Method  
Participants 
One hundred-and-four children (51 boys and 53 girls) with a mean age of 7.8 years (age range 
7.0–8.7 years) participated in the study. The children were recruited from eight primary schools, 
located in midsized towns in the Netherlands. The schools were selected on the basis of their 
willingness to participate in what was clearly a time-consuming exercise. The children attended 
classes at second grade level and represented a full range of socio-economic backgrounds. 
Parental consent for participation was obtained in all cases. Dutch was the first language spoken 
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at school and at home for all participants. Data collection was undertaken by trained postgraduate 
students with experience of educational testing. All children took full part in the relevant testing 
sessions. 
Design 
The study employed a pre-test-post-test-2-experimental-groups randomized block design, with 
blocking based on the Exclusion subtest from a Dutch child intelligence test, the RAKIT 
(Bleichrodt, Drenth, Zaal, & Resing, 1984). On the basis of the blocking procedure, children in 
each school were, randomly allocated to one of two treatment groups: an ‘unguided practice’ 
group; or an ‘unguided practice plus training’ group, subsequently identified in this paper as the 
‘training group’. During the first week of the study, each child was given an inductive reasoning 
test (Exclusion) and measures of spatial and verbal working memory. Subsequently, a 
microgenetic design with two pre-tests and two post-tests was employed. Children in the training 
group received training between the pre-test and post-test sessions. In all other respects they 
received the same inputs as the children in the unguided practice group. Thus, other than the 
training session, both groups tackled the same analogy items without other forms of training, 
instruction, help or feedback. Unguided practice sessions ranged from 20-40 minutes per child 
and were of equal duration for both groups of children. The training session took 30-60 minutes 
per child. Table 1 provides an overview of the experimental design used in this study. 
 
Insert Table 1  
 
Instruments 
 Exclusion. The Exclusion subtest from a Dutch child intelligence test (RAKIT: 
Bleichrodt et al., 1984), served as the means for blocking the groups. This measure taps the 
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child’s ability to detect rules by means of induction, an important prerequisite for successful 
inductive/analogical reasoning. The subtest (α=.87) consists of 40 items each containing four 
abstract figures. Three of the figures can be grouped together according to a rule, and the child’s 
task is to select the figure that does not conform to this. 
 Verbal and spatial recall. The screening measure from the computerized Automated 
Working Memory Assessment (AWMA) battery (Alloway, 2007), administered during the pre-
testing phase, was used to measure verbal and visual spatial working-memory capacity. The 
AWMA assesses both the simultaneous storage and processing of information. The screening 
version exists of two working-memory subtests: Listening recall (verbal WM; test-retest 
reliability r=.88) and Spatial recall (visuo-spatial WM; test-retest reliability r=.79)). The listening 
recall subtest utilizes sequences of spoken sentences. The child must indicate whether the spoken 
sentence is true or false. At the end of each item, the child has to recall the final word of each 
sentence, in the order in which the sentences were presented. In the spatial recall subtest, the 
child sees a picture with two abstract shapes; the shape at the right has a red dot somewhere. The 
shape might be rotated or flipped. They are then required to indicate whether the shapes to the 
left and right are the same or not. At the end of each item, the correct location of the red dot must 
be identified (Alloway, 2007).  
 Animalogica: Dynamic test of Figural reasoning 
  Figural analogies: pre- and post-tests. The analogical reasoning tasks utilized in this 
study consisted of an adapted open-ended response version of the concrete figural test 
Animalogica  (see, Stevenson et al., 2009; Stevenson, Touw, & Resing, 2011; Stevenson, Heiser, 
& Resing, 2016). To solve the analogies (A:B = C: ?, see Figure 1), the children were required to 
encode item attributes and infer a rule between two given animal pictures (A, B [the base]) and 
then apply this to the third picture (C [the target]) of the analogy. Finally, a fourth animal picture 
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had to be selected (from a range of possibilities), so that the relationship between the third and 
fourth picture equaled that of the first two pictures (e.g., Sternberg & Rifkin, 1979). This open-
ended response version enables children to identify the correct rule and then search for the right 
answer pictured on one of 36 cards, variously showing six types of animals, three colors, and two 
sizes. The cards were printed on both sides with the same images, although facing in opposite 
directions, enabling the child to transform both quantity and orientation of the animals for solving 
the analogy. Four parallel sets of 20 items each, increasing in difficulty level, were used. The sets 
were designed to look different to the children but the changes in animal type and color were of a 
similar level of difficulty.  
Insert Figure 1 
 
The items of each set varied in difficulty level from two to six transformations involving, size, 
color, quantity, orientation, position, and type of animal. In the analogy in Figure 1at the left, for 
example, we can detect one small yellow lion (A) that has been transformed into two small 
yellow lions (B). We also see two small blue horses looking into the same direction as the lions 
(C), so we need to look for one small blue horse looking to the right to fill D. Based on the cards 
representing children’s responses, it was possible to see which transformations children had used 
to construct their answer, and if and how many of the transformations necessary to solve the 
items were actually used. 
 Figure analogies training. The training procedure used in the present investigation was 
originally pioneered by Campione et al., (1985), and has been successfully further developed and 
utilized in studies on dynamic testing (Resing, 2000; Resing & Elliott, 2011). The procedure 
involves the use, during training, of a series of adaptive and standardized, hierarchically ordered, 
prompts that proceed from general, metacognitive, to increasingly task-specific prompts. The 
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prompts are only provided when a child is unable to proceed independently. Thus, the children 
are provided with the minimum number of prompts possible to enable progression through the 
test. The training of the dynamic test procedure consisted of an age-adapted set of 7 concrete 
figural analogies similar to those employed in the other sessions (adapted from Stevenson et al., 
2009, 2011). The procedures involved are described in Appendix A. Stevenson et al. (2016) 
reported internal consistencies for the pre-test and training procedure (α=.78,  =.78) and post-tests 
1 and 2 (α=.90 and .85, respectively). 
Procedure 
All children were, seen individually, once a week over a two month period. The same testers 
were employed across the full series of six sessions. During the first week of the study, the 
children were given inductive reasoning and spatial and verbal working memory tasks. 
Subsequently, two pre-tests and two post-tests were administered (see overview of design). 
Between these, children in the training group received 30-60 minutes of training. The length of 
these sessions depended, in part, upon the number of hints they required. Other than the training 
session, both groups tackled the same analogy items without any other forms of training, 
instruction, help or feedback. Unguided practice sessions ranged from 20-40 minutes per child 
and were of equal duration for both groups.   
  At the start of each session, the child was presented with a booklet containing the 
analogies, and baskets with small animal cards for constructing the correct answers in accordance 
with the transformations used in the items. The examiner showed the animal cards and explained 
their features: color, size, and the possibility to flip to the opposite direction. The examiner then 
identified the first analogy and stated that this was a ‘kind of puzzle’ with three boxes containing 
animals and a fourth empty box (C-term or D-term), in which the child needed to construct the 
solution to ‘the puzzle’ using the animal cards. After producing each solution, the child was 
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asked how he or she had solved ´the puzzle´. All verbal and behavioral responses were recorded 
by video and audio. Examiners also recorded children’s behaviors and explanations on coded 
response forms. One author always checked and double-checked the scoring of children’s 
solutions using these recordings. 
Scoring and analyses 
 Scoring. Each child obtained, per practice session, a ‘Complete Analogies Score’: the sum 
of all analogies that were completely and accurately solved (score range 0-20); a 
‘Transformations Correct Score’: the sum of accurate transformations as evidenced by the 
child’s behavioral solutions. These were calculated from data on the answer forms and findings 
were subsequently double-checked by means of scrutiny of the video materials (score range 0-
110). The transformations refer to the changes that occur in the items in relation to size, color, 
quantity, orientation, position, and type of animal. We counted the number of transformations 
children laid down correctly, both vertically and horizontally in the matrix. In the left part of 
Figure 1, for example, there are three transformations: the quantity changes horizontally (one to 
two animals), the type of animal changes vertically (lion to horse) as does the color of the 
animals (blue to red). The matrix at the right of Figure 1 includes 6 transformations (horizontally: 
position, quantity, orientation, and type of animal, and vertically: size and color). If there were 
similar transformations in both columns and rows, they were counted twice. The children also 
obtained a ‘Transformations Explained Score’: the sum of all accurate transformations that were 
followed by explanations as to ‘how they solved the puzzle’ (score range 0-110). The child had to 
verbalize each transformation, for example, “this one is blue also”, or “here it was a horse and 
now it is a dog” or “here I see one dog and over there, there are two dogs”. Utterances that 
indicated no underlying reasoning such as “just like that”, with, or without pointing, were not 
scored, pointed directions (horizontal/vertical) were scored The Complete Analogies Score was 
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employed as a measure for accuracy, the number of Transformations Correct Score as a measure 
for the (in)completeness of the children’s problem solving, and the Transformations Explained 
Score as a measure of the quality of their problem solving strategies. 
 We identified two groups of children on the basis of their problem-solving behavior at the 
first session: 1) children showing consistent inadequate, non-analogical reasoning (<20 percent 
correctly solved items), and 2) children showing variable, adequate and inadequate, reasoning 
(20-80 percent correctly solved items). This 20% benchmark was chosen on the basis of the mean 
of the scores at pre-test: the Animalogica tasks had a high level of difficulty. Children answered, 
on average, about 4 items correctly during the pre-test (see Table 2). Only one participant 
answered more than 80 percent of the items correctly (i.e., consistent analogical strategy-use). 
This child was reassigned to the group of children who showed variable strategy-use.  
Analyses. Repeated measures analysis is frequently used to analyze data derived from 
repeated measurements of the same individuals. However, microgenetic data sets can be 
considered to be comprised of multilevel data, where repeated measurements are nested within 
individuals (Hox, 2010; Kreft & De Leeuw, 1998; Van der Leeden, 1998). Multilevel analysis 
(MLA) was used to analyze the data because it allowed us to model the intervention and effects 
of practice separately, and over time. The analyses were carried out in R (R Core Team, 2014), as 
a series of logical steps involving the increased addition of predictors, in line with our 
hypotheses. 
 Linear Mixed Modelling analysis, utilizing a multilevel approach (MLA applied with the 
lme4 package for R Statistical Software; Bates, Maechler, Bolker, & Walker, 2015), appeared to 
be particularly valuable for the present study as it enabled us to inspect growth trajectories based 
on data obtained from repeated measurement moments (Level-1), for each individual (Level-2). It 
also enabled us to investigate systematic variation between these trajectories as a function of our 
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background variables and experimental treatment (Van der Leeden, 1998). Additionally, Linear 
Mixed Modeling enabled us to add two types of explanatory variables to the model: time-
constant and time-varying variables. This allowed us to model both the average growth 
trajectories of various groups of children, as well as the individual growth trajectories of each 
child (Hox, 2010). The raw data were used to describe the development of children’s analogical 
reasoning performances defined in terms of accuracy, number of transformations, and number of 
transformations mentioned in verbalizations, over sessions (see Table 2). Then, a series of models 
was compared for each of the three dependent variables using maximum likelihood estimation 
(FML). 
 First, an unconditional means model (model 0) was carried out that included a random 
intercept representing fixed (average) and random (variance) effects to examine variation in the 
intercept (i.e., variable mean) of each variable. In model 1, the unconditional growth model, we 
included the linear effect of time. These models were carried out to analyze the variance in the 
three dependent variables between children and over time within children, respectively. The 
subsequent models included predictor variables to explain remaining variance. The following 
predictors were added to the model: group verbal and spatial working memory, and initial 
variability.  
Each successive model included an additional predictor variable or interaction between 
predictors. The linear effects of time were included in all models except for model 0. Likelihood 
ratio (LR) tests (using the Chi-square distribution) and fit indices (AIC and BIC) were examined 
to assess how the model fit of the new model compared to that of the previous fitted model. All of 
the variables contained a meaningful 0-point to facilitate the interpretation of the outcomes of the 
analyses (Hox, 2010). For reference purposes, the regression equations for the final models are 
displayed in Appendix B.  
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 After running the MLA’s, we focused on more in-depth analyses of group-growth curves 
of analogical reasoning over time. Siegler (2007) posited the benefit of trial-by-trial assessments 
in microgenetic studies. To achieve this, we examined: the number of complete analogical 
solutions; the number of correct transformations the child produced in both incomplete and 
complete analogical solutions; and the number of these correct transformations for which the 
child was able to describe their strategy.  
 Results  
Psychometric analyses regarding the pre-test outcomes revealed a high internal consistency for 
the number of complete analogical solutions (α=.90) .Test-retest coefficients were calculated for 
test session 1 and test session 2 (complete analogical solutions, r=.86, p<.001; transformations 
correct, r= .94, p<.001; transformations explained, r=.89, p<.001). 
 Before examining the findings from each of our research questions in detail, we checked 
for possible initial differences between the training and practice groups using t-tests. There were 
no differences between the groups in the Exclusion test (t(102)=−-1.14, p=.26) and in the number 
of complete analogical solutions (t(102)=0.39, p=.70), transformations (t(102)=0.76, p=.45), or 
explanations (t(102)=0.78, p=.44) at Session One. Means and standard deviations per session and 
group are provided in Table 2. Verbal working memory scores (t(102)=0.47, p=.64) and spatial 
working memory scores (t(102)=-0.50, p=.62) also did not differ between the two groups (see 
Table 3).  
Insert Tables 2 & 3 
 
 Growth curve analyses (MLA) were based on raw scores, and were used to model growth 
across three outcome variables: the number of a) complete solutions; b) correct transformations 
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and c) explained transformations. Several hierarchical analyses were performed to find the best 
fitting growth model for each dependent variable separately.  
Complete solutions (accuracy) 
Model 0 (the unconditional means model, see Table 4) revealed a significant fixed effect of the 
intercept (p<.001). The intra-class correlation coefficient (ICC) indicated that 76% of the total 
variation in the analogy scores was attributable to inter-child differences. We included our time 
predictor into the level-1 sub-model in order to explain the residual within-child variance (7.98).  
 In model 1 (the unconditional growth model), the fixed effect of linear time was, as 
expected, significant. Children, on average, increased in accuracy across sessions. There was a 
positive covariance (.22) between the slope and intercept, which revealed that those with higher 
initial analogy scores generally demonstrated higher rates of growth. Inspection of the variance 
components revealed large remaining variance in complete solutions both between, and within, 
children. The R2 value indicated that 52.2% of the within-person variation in accuracy was 
accounted for by the linear effect of time.  
 
Insert Table 4 
 
 In model 2, (continuing examination of hypothesis 1), the positive fixed effect for group 
showed that the children generally increased their accuracy across sessions as the estimated rate 
of change (0.902) for repeated practice showed. The trained children obtained, as expected, 
higher scores than children in the unguided practice group. This difference in performance took 
place, in particular, between session 2 and 3. The negative time x group effect indicated that 
trained children’s reasoning accuracy, unexpectedly, decreased from the first to second post-test 
(session 3 to 4; see Figure 2). The outcomes of model 2 also revealed large remaining inter- and 
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intra- variance children’s accuracy scores. The variance in Time indicated that unexplained 
variance accounted for children’s rate of change.  
  
Insert Figure 2 
 
 In model 3 we inspected the effects of both verbal and spatial working memory on initial 
status (see hypotheses 2 and 3). An LRT indicated that the inclusion of these predictors resulted 
in an improved model (X2=23.66, df=2, p<.001). As expected, spatial working memory 
significantly added to the prediction of the number of complete solutions at pre-test. Children 
with greater spatial working-memory capacity obtained higher accuracy scores at session 1. The 
fixed effect of verbal working memory was not significant. Model 4 added the interaction effects 
between time and verbal working memory and spatial working memory respectively, and this led 
to a significant improvement in model fit (X2=9.01, df= 2, p=.01). The interaction of verbal but 
not spatial working memory with time was significant. Contrary to our expectations, spatial 
working memory was not related to improvement through repeated practice. The interaction 
between time and spatial working memory was therefore not further included in modelling. 
Model 5 added the interaction effects of group with verbal working memory and spatial working 
memory respectively. Model fit did not improve, indicating that the children were able to benefit 
from dynamic testing and improve their analogical reasoning performance irrespective of the 
capacity of their working memory. The inclusion of the three-way interactions (spatial working 
memory x group x time and verbal working memory x group x time) also did not improve model 
fit. 
 In model 6, initial variability was included and this led, unsurprisingly, to an 
improvement in model fit as indicated by smaller AIC and BIC fit indices. However, adding the 
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interaction between initial variability and time in model 7 did not result in a better fitting model. 
Contrary to our expectations, variability in children’s strategy-use at the first session was not 
related to the rate of change in solving analogies. In model 8, we included the interaction of 
initial variability and group, which significantly improved model fit compared to model 6 
(X2=6.81, df=1, p<.01). The negative interaction effect revealed, as expected, that the dynamic-
test training reduced the influence of children’s initial variability in the use of analogical 
strategies. Including the three-way interaction of initial variability x group x time did not improve 
model fit. Results of the likelihood ratio tests and inspection of the AIC and BIC indices showed 
that model 8 was the best fit to our data. Model validation with residual plots (Package ‘ggplot2’; 
Wickham, & Chang, 2015) did not reveal any violation of assumptions. 
Summary for accuracy. Our final model revealed that the training was successful in 
improving children’s accuracy. However, the benefits of training were not fully sustained 
throughout the study sessions. Our findings further indicated that children with low initial 
variability in analogical reasoning profited more from the dynamic-test training than children 
who already demonstrated some analogical reasoning at pre-test. At this first session, spatial 
working memory was positively related to the number of complete analogical solutions, whereas 
(in the final model) verbal working memory was a significant predictor of children’s initial status 
and rate of change. Children with greater verbal working-memory capacity were found to 
improve more in accuracy across test sessions.  
Number of (explained) transformations  
  The outcomes of the various models we tested regarding children’s use of correct 
transformations and the number of explained transformations are depicted in Tables 5 and 6, 
respectively. The unconditional means model (model 0) of both outcome variables showed a 
significant fixed effect of the intercept (p<.001). For both outcome variables, an ICC of .81 was 
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found, indicating that 81% of the total variation in the number of (explained) transformations was 
attributable to inter-child differences. The unconditional growth model (model 1) of both 
outcome variables revealed significant fixed effects of linear time. The R2 values indicated that 
52% and 36.7% of the within-child variation in the number of transformations and the number of 
explained transformations respectively, was systematically associated with linear time.  
 
Insert Tables 5 and 6 
 
 Model 2 included group as a predictor. A significant time effect was found for the number 
of transformations, indicating that children, on average, increased their number of correct 
transformations across sessions as a result of repeated practice. Unexpectedly, however, repeated 
practice did not lead children to significantly increase their number of explained transformations 
across sessions. The significant fixed effects of group in the models of both outcome variables 
revealed that the trained children correctly produced and explained more transformations than 
those who only had unguided practice. This difference seemed to be most evident between 
sessions 2 and 3. However, the effect of training again decreased at the last session for both 
outcome variables (transformations and explained transformations), as indicated by negative time 
x group effects (see Figure 2).  
 In model 3, we included the main effects of verbal and spatial working memory. This 
resulted in improved models for the number of both transformations (X2=18.87, df=2, p<.001) 
and explained transformations (X2=21.18, df=2, p<.001). As expected, spatial working memory 
but not verbal working memory added significantly to the prediction of the number of (explained) 
transformations at the first session. Model 4 included the interaction effects of time with verbal 
working memory and spatial working memory. Model fit did not improve for the number of 
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transformations, or explained transformations. In model 5 the interaction effects of group with 
verbal working memory and spatial working memory were added. Similar to model 4, non-
significant improvements were revealed, indicating that verbal and spatial working memory 
capacity did not influence children’s training benefits. The 3-way interactions (spatial working 
memory x group x time and verbal working memory x group x time) failed to improve model fit 
for both the number of transformations and the number of explained transformations. The main 
effect of verbal working memory was no longer included in the models of these outcome 
variables after this point. 
 The main effect of initial variability was included in model 6, which, again, led to an 
improvement in model fit for both outcome variables as indicated by smaller AIC and BIC fit 
indices. The interaction of initial variability and time in model 7 did not result in a better fitting 
model for the number of transformations or explained transformations.  
  We included the interaction between initial variability and group in model 8, which led to 
a significant improvement in fit compared to model 6 for the number of transformations 
(X2=16.89, df=1, p<.001) and the number of explained transformations (X2=6.14, df=1, p=.01). 
The negative interaction effect indicated that dynamic-test training reduced the influence of 
children’s initial variability in the use of analogical strategies. Including the interaction of initial 
variability x group x time did also not improve model fit for the number of transformations or 
explained transformations. Again, model 8 was selected as having the best fit to the data for both 
outcome variables. Model validation (‘ggplot2’) showed that assumptions were met. 
 Summary for (explained) transformations. The final models indicated that dynamic-
test training was successful in improving children’s number of transformations and explained 
transformations. However, as has been shown, the initial benefits of training were not fully 
maintained throughout the test sessions. The later models indicated that children with low initial 
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variability in analogical reasoning profited more from the dynamic-test training than children 
who were already capable of some analogical reasoning at the first session. Results also showed 
that spatial working memory was positively related to the number of transformations and the 
number of explained transformations at pre-test. The MLA results for (explained) transformations 
and for accuracy differed slightly. For accuracy, results indicated that verbal working memory 
influenced children’s initial status and rate of change. Verbal working memory was, however, not 
influential for children’s initial status or rate of change regarding their (explained) 
transformations.  
Growth-curve trajectories of several subgroups 
After running the MLA’s, we focused on more in-depth analyses of growth curves of analogical 
reasoning over time. The results indicated that the most influential variables on children’s 
reasoning performance were: group, spatial working-memory capacity, and initial variability. 
Spatial working memory was dichotomized into a ‘lower score’ and ‘higher score’ category, 
based on the median score. This allowed us to visually inspect the progression in reasoning 
performance across sessions for eight subgroups (see Table 7).  
 
Insert Table 7 
 
 The differential growth in reasoning performance across sessions of the eight subgroups 
for the three dependent variables is shown in Figures 3, 4 and 5.  
 
Insert Figures 3,4, & 5 
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These figures show that children who displayed limited capacity for analogical reasoning at the 
first session (low variability), made gains after they had received training. Rapid improvement 
was apparent for all three of the outcome variables. However, these children showed, on average, 
a dip in performance at the last session for all outcome variables. In contrast, children who 
displayed greater evidence of analogical reasoning at the first session (high variability) showed a 
more gradual increase in the quality of their reasoning. 
Discussion 
The main purpose of the current study was to examine whether dynamic training versus unguided 
practice resulted in different change paths in strategy-use and in performance accuracy. On the 
basis of the literature (Halford et al., 2010; Richland et al., 2006) it was anticipated that measures 
of visual-spatial and verbal working memory and initial variability in children’s problem-solving 
would provide a richer understanding of factors underpinning individual and group growth 
trajectories in analogical reasoning. Our study also sought to provide a meaningful context in 
which to investigate the potential value of new ways (both methodological and statistical) to 
examine inter- and intra-individual change in problem-solving processes within a collaborative 
testing context. For this reason, our study employed a microgenetic, trial-by-trial assessment to 
investigate variability in children’s strategy-use and to gauge subsequent progress in their use of 
problem-solving strategies after either intervention or unguided practice.  
 Our study outcomes revealed that, although repeated practice led to greater accuracy and 
a superior behavioral strategy-use (with the training adding significantly to this effect), unguided 
practice alone did not significantly change children’s verbal explanations of strategy-use. In 
contrast, after training, children showed significant improvements in solving the analogy tasks 
and in both their behavioral strategy-use and verbal accounts. Having tackled each task, each 
child was asked how they had solved ´the puzzle´. It was found that adaptive (scaffolded) 
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instruction appeared to be necessary to deepen the children’s understanding of how to solve the 
problems. This deeper understanding seemed to be a necessity before an adequate verbal 
explanation could be offered (e.g., Crowley & Siegler, 1999) [see also, Rittle-Johnson (2006) for 
a similar finding]. A related explanation for the limited benefits of unguided practice might be 
that children in our study had to construct their answers to open-ended tasks. Stevenson, Heiser, 
& Resing (2016) found that after training, children who had to construct their responses provided 
higher quality explanations than those who received a multiple-choice format. It seems likely that 
the combination of training and the construction of the answer helped to deepen the child’s 
understanding.  
 Our findings only partially confirm those reported by Tunteler et al. (2008) and Tunteler 
and Resing (2010), who, in their microgenetic studies with classical geometric analogies, found 
differential progression paths for trained and unguided practice groups, but growth in verbal 
explanations over time for children in both groups. This may reflect the greater challenge of the 
items utilized in the present study. Oral explanations of problem solving also reflect 
metacognitive skills (Efklides, 2006) and do not necessarily parallel children’s problem-solving 
processes, particularly if they are young (Ericsson & Simon, 1984; Veenman, 2015). It seems, 
therefore, that children can (partially) construct an answer but (still) operate at different levels of 
verbal and behavioral strategy-use, being able to offer a verbal account only after training 
(Resing et al., 2012) [see also, Rittle-Johnson, Fyfe, Loehr, and Miller (2015) for related findings 
in the early numeracy domain].  
 Contrary to our expectations, initial variability in the child’s performance appeared not to 
be related to change across test sessions (e.g., Siegler, 2007; Tunteler & Resing, 2007). Children 
with low initial variability in solving analogies profited from the training as well as those who 
were able to demonstrate a basic level of analogical reasoning at the start of the study. The 
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training apparently provided them with better tools for constructing and explaining their answers. 
While dynamic testing appeared to improve the performance of children, irrespective of 
variability, we were rather surprised to discover that performance dipped at the final 
measurement, although inspection of individual growth curves also showed large inter- and intra-
individual differences in change paths. The growing understanding of how to solve the tasks as 
evidenced for many of our participants seemed to be time and/or context-bound and did not 
transfer to a parallel task administered two weeks later. These outcomes may suggest that training 
was insufficiently extensive, or needed to be provided more frequently over a longer period. 
Another explanation, supported by the differential patterns of growth-curve trajectories observed, 
is that specific subgroups of children might require a more tailored form of scaffolded instruction 
and feedback (Siegler & Svetina, 2002) operating within their zone of proximal development 
(Alibali & Goldin-Meadow, 1993; Granott, 2002; Wood, Bruner, & Ross, 1976). Of course, some 
children may have lost interest in having to solve the tasks repeatedly, and may have become less 
motivated to explain all of the various transformations for every item that they were asked to 
solve (Siegler & Engle, 1994).  
 Spatial working memory was as expected found to be related to children’s visual-spatial 
encoding [visual processing being an important component of figural tasks (Laski & Siegler, 
2014; Rasmussen & Bisanz, 2005; Van der Ven, Boom, Kroesbergen, & Leseman, 2012)], 
although this was not associated with improvement on the tasks. In contrast,  verbal working-
memory positively influenced both children’s initial ability and rate of change but only in relation 
to full construction (accuracy) of the tasks (see also Siegler, 2006). It was not, however, related to 
the (change) in number of dimensions detected in the task material, or the number and 
progression of verbal explanations. These findings seem to differ from those of an earlier study 
by Tunteler and Resing (2010), in which children with a smaller memory span were able to catch 
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up with their peers after training. While the reasons for this discrepancy are unclear, it should be 
noted that the tasks in the present study were more demanding in terms of cognitive load and 
most participants, struggled, especially at the initial stage (Halford et al., 2010). However, the 
role of working memory (both spatial and verbal) appeared to diminish as discrete aspects of task 
performance are considered. As children had to construct their answers, it was possible to 
examine a range of performance variables: the outcome (accurate/inaccurate), the number of 
objects/features that change and which have to be detected by the child (ranging from 1-6)), and 
the number of verbal explanations. The graduated prompts training focused on this process of 
finding changing features in order to solve the analogies. Apparently, as a result of the training, 
cognitive load diminished, but not sufficiently to completely overcome differences in working 
memory. An explanation for this finding might be that, of course, a child must start with 
encoding the task features (visual-spatial), but after this first step, the inductive reasoning process 
necessarily has more of a verbal character. Training is given orally as well. To be able to analyze, 
find, and explain the task solution, the child needs sound verbal reasoning (and working memory) 
ability. In addition, other aspects of higher-order executive functioning not measured in this 
study, for example, inhibitory control skills (Richland and Burchinal, 2013) appear to play an 
important role in solving analogies.  
 Our findings support Siegler’s (2006) “overlapping waves” theory, whereby high initial 
variability of an individual’s strategy-use is likely to predict more substantial later learning. 
Interestingly though, growth trajectories of children with larger (spatial) working-memory 
capacity, who had received training, suggested that a given level of initial performance was not 
always necessary for rapid learning to occur. Dynamic testing appeared to be a necessary step for 
some to learn how to solve the analogy problems: after this, some children displayed a rate of 
change that exceeded many others.  
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 This study has sought to provide both a methodological and a substantive contribution. 
Firstly, advanced multilevel analyses were used in combination with a microgenetic design to 
examine verbal and visual-spatial working-memory components separately (Alloway et al., 
2006), and in combination with initial variability and the effects of training versus unguided 
repeated practice. Secondly, our means of analysis (multilevel analysis for repeated measurement 
data) enabled us to inspect group-growth trajectories in combination, rather than in isolation, with 
systematic variation between these trajectories as a function of the background variables and 
experimental treatment (Van der Leeden, 1998). Furthermore, our analogy tasks were open-
ended; children had to construct their answers so enabling us to undertake fine-grained analyses 
of children’s solving processes (e.g., Harpaz-Itay, Kaniel, & Ben-Amram, 2006; Resing & Elliott, 
2011; Tzuriel & Galinka, 2000). Although we know that such tasks are more difficult than 
multiple choice tasks (e.g., Behuniak, Rogers, & Dirir, 1996; In’nami & Kozumi, 2009; Martinez, 
1999), and individuals require more help during training to solve these tasks (Stevenson et al., 
2016), these type of tasks may improve learning after extensive instruction. 
 Our study had some limitations. Firstly, our design required a large number of contact 
hours with the schools and participating children. While many of them were clearly enthusiastic 
participants, others may have become less motivated or attentive over time, particularly where 
difficulties were experienced. This was the main reason why children were given just one, rather 
short training session, which might have led to less than optimal difference between the test 
outcomes of the trained and non-trained children. Secondly, only two subtests measuring 
(aspects) of verbal and figural working memory were administered. To strengthen our 
conclusions regarding the respective roles of verbal and figural working memory in solving 
analogies before and after training/practice, we would ideally need more measures, based on a 
memory model built upon empirical relations between working memory, short-term memory, and 
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general fluid intelligence, for example Engle et al., 1999. A more comprehensive measurement of 
the verbal memory component may be particularly valuable given the complexity of analogies 
and inductive reasoning tasks in general. In addition, the current study could only provide some 
global information regarding the underlying change mechanisms in various subgroups. The 
relatively small numbers of children in subgroups formed on the basis of working memory and 
initial variability, for example, did not permit us to offer very fine grained conclusions regarding 
variability in change over time. As noted above, we clearly saw large individual differences, 
variable strategy use, and variable learning progression related to working memory, but only 
when comparing children at a more individual level. Larger training programs (e.g., Tzuriel & 
George, 2009) with long-term follow-up, and more specific and in-depth measurement of various 
aspects of working memory are needed to confirm the individual growth curves we found. 
 Analogical reasoning is of fundamental importance for the understanding, transfer, and 
retention of many key educational principles in school (Vendetti, Matlen, Richland, & Bunge, 
2015). However, laboratory studies suggest that this is not always a spontaneous process (Gick & 
Holyoak, 1980; 1983) and children can be easily distracted by irrelevant information, for 
example, perceptual features rather than underlying relationships (Richland et al., 2006). Clearly, 
the skill of the teacher in supporting the child’s use of analogical reasoning is key to effective 
learning (Richland & Simms, 2015) yet teachers are unlikely to feel confident in how best to 
support individual children. While we know that differences in the nature and frequency of adult 
prompts geared to encourage the comparison of analogical relationships can have a significant 
influence upon children’s learning and retention (Vendetti et al., 2015), we still have much to 
learn about the most effective ways of offering differential instruction that reflects individual 
differences. 
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While the current study did not focus in detail on underlying change mechanisms, 
comparison of the variability and quality of growth-trajectories of different subgroups (such as 
those identified in the present study) may help to reveal specific strengths and weaknesses that 
influence particular learning trajectories. This information could be used to better predict 
children’s growth-trajectories and ameliorate potential problems by the use of  specialized and 
targeted instruction or scaffolding. While working memory capacity has been found to influential 
for all forms of relational reasoning, including that of analogical reasoning, our findings 
suggested a somewhat complex picture about its relationship to the children’s progress. Further 
research is needed to ascertain which components of working memory are most influential for 
successful performance and for ongoing development, and whether such factors might be 
different for high versus low performing children (Grossnickle et al., 2016). Dynamic testing may 
ultimately contribute to a greater understanding of how differential forms of instruction, ranging 
from metacognitive to more concrete (Resing, 2000, 2013), can be tailored for children with 
different cognitive processing profiles.  
 In a diagnostic context, and in future research, it may prove useful to add a task whereby 
the child is asked to construct one or more problems for the examiner (in this case a figural 
analogy) (Bosma & Resing, 2006; Harpaz-Itay et al., 2006; Kohnstamm, 1967). Findings from 
these studies suggest that such a task may further activate higher-level metacognition, additional 
strategies and superior explanations.  
Within the field of educational psychology, there continues to be significant debate about 
the value of domain general cognitive assessment for the purposes of informing educational 
intervention (Compton, Fuchs, Fuchs, Lambert, & Hamlett, 2012; Elliott & Resing, 2015; 
Fletcher et al., 2011; Fletcher & Vaughn, 2009; Hale et al., 2008, 2010; Reynolds & Shaywitz, 
2009). In the eyes of many educationalists and psychologists, psychometric tools and domain-
   
33 
 
general approaches have proven valuable for the purposes of prediction and selection, yet 
continue to offer little to help teachers for making informed decisions about how best to help 
individual children. It is surely incumbent on educational and cognitive psychologists to devise 
more sophisticated approaches to understanding individual children’s development, and to use 
this information to inform the design of powerful forms of instruction tailored to individual 
needs. Analogical reasoning, for example, seems particularly important for school domains such 
as math (Richland, Zur, & Holyoak, 2007) and reading (Goswami, 2002). Further fine-grained 
research into the inductive reasoning processes might generate a link to more domain-specific 
diagnostic research, such as how best to operate response to intervention (RTI) programs. The 
approach outlined in the present article represents an attempt to make progress in this direction. 
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Appendix A Training procedure (schematic) 
Appendix B Regression equations per final MLA model of each analogical performance measure 
 
Step Instruction  Right Answer Wrong Answer 
0 0.1. Today we are going to make puzzles again. However, 
this time I will give you some help.  
0.2. Just like the other times, there are animals in three 
boxes, but there are no animals in the fourth box. 
0.3. Again please solve this puzzle by putting the animals 
in this empty box that you think belong there. 
1. Yes, that’s correct. 
2. How did you solve the 
puzzle? / Why did you 
put these animals here?  
Go to step 6 
 
1. Your solution isn’t 
completely correct yet.  
2. I will put the cards back 
and give you some help. 
 
1 1.1. First, you think about where to start.  
1.2. Experimenter tells child which boxes of the puzzle 
belong together.  
1.3. What do you think should be put in the empty box? 
1. Yes, that’s correct. 
2. How did you solve the 
puzzle? / Why did you 
put these animals here?  
Go to step 6 
 1. It’s not completely 
correct yet. 
2. I will give some more 
help. [experimenter puts 
the cards back]  
   
2 2.1. You can solve the puzzle by following these steps. 
2.2. First, you compare the boxes and then you think how 
the boxes belong together. 
2.3. Then you put the animals in this empty box that you 
think belong there.  
2.4. When you have solved the puzzle, you can check if 
your answer is correct by comparing the boxes. 
1. Yes, that’s correct. 
2. How did you solve the 
puzzle? / Why did you 
put these animals here?  
Go to step 6  
 
1. It’s (almost/ not 
completely) correct yet. 
2. Let's look at it 
together. [experimenter 
puts the cards back] 
  
3 3.1. We start by comparing the boxes. 
3.2 Experimenter asks child to explain changes from A to 
B and from A to C. 
3.3. Experimenter points out the similarity between [C:D] 
and [A:B], and between [B:D] and [A:C]. 
3.4. So, how do we fill the empty box to solve the puzzle? 
3.5. Experimenter asks child to check whether his/her 
answer is correct. 
1. Yes, that’s correct. 
2. How did you solve the 
puzzle? / Why did you 
put these animals here?  
Go to step 6 
 
1. Ok, (it’s almost correct) 
I shall give you some 
more help. [experimenter 
puts the cards back] 
4 4.1. This box [A] changed to that box [B] because.... 
[Experimenter explains all transformations from A to B]  
4.2. This box [B] changed to that box [D] because.... 
[Experimenter explains all transformations from B to D]  
 
1. Yes, that’s correct. 
2. How did you solve the 
puzzle? / Why did you 
put these animals here?  
Go to step 6 
1. We are going to solve 
the puzzle together. 
[experimenter puts the 
cards back] 
5 5.1. We start with the animals. Which animals do we 
need? If answered incorrectly: Experimenter gives correct 
answer and explains animal type changes in [A:B] and 
[B:D]. 
5.2. Which color [animal(s)] do we need / and which 
color [animal(s)]? If answered incorrectly: Experimenter 
gives correct answer and explains color changes in [A:B] 
and [B:D]. 
5.3. Do we need large or small [animal(s)] / and large or 
small [animal(s)]? If answered incorrectly: Experimenter 
gives correct answer and explains size changes in [A:B] 
and [B:D]. 
5.4. Do we need one or two [animal(s)] / and one or two 
[animal(s)]? If answered incorrectly: Experimenter gives 
correct answer and explains quantity changes in [A:B] 
and [B:D]. 
5.5. In which direction do the [animal(s)] / and 
[animal(s)] need to walk? If answered incorrectly: 
Experimenter gives correct answer and explains direction 
changes in [A:B] and [B:D]. 
5.6. Do we place the [animal(s)] at the top or the bottom 
of the empty box / and the [animal(s)]? If answered 
incorrectly: Experimenter gives correct answer and 
explains position changes in [A:B] and [B:D]. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[In partnership with the child the right answer is 
created. Each sub-step needs to be mentioned] 
 
1. That is correct!  
2. And why is this correct? 
 
[experimenter continues to request information until 
the child gives no more information] 
 
6 Give the correct explanation for the answer. 
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Regression Equation 
 
Solutions Correct = 1.09 + 8.13 variability + 0.03 spatial working memory + 6.31 condition 
+ 0.03 verbal working memory*session– 1.88 condition*variability – 1.47 
session*condition. 
 
Transformations Correct (in behavioral solutions) = 24.72 + 2.28 session + 47.99 
variability + 32.75 condition – 15.33 condition*variability – 4.45 session*condition.  
 
Transformations Explained = 3.99 + 29.84 variability + 0.11 spatial working memory + 
23.82 condition – 6.97 condition*variability – 5.54 session*condition. 
 
Note. All variables contain a meaningful 0-point (including session).  
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Figure 1a  
 
 
 
Figure 1  
 
Examples of figural analogies used during non-guided practice and dynamic testing sessions 
(adopted from Stevenson et al., 2009) 
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Figure 2 
Progression in the number of correct solutions (upper figure); change patterns (middle figure) in 
the number of correctly solved transformations; and the number of transformations explained 
across sessions (lower figure), for the training and repeated practice groups respectively.  
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Figure 3 
Number of complete solutions for the eight subgroups across sessions 
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Figure 4 
Number of correct transformations for the eight subgroups across sessions 
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Figure 5  
Number of explained transformations for the eight subgroups across sessions 
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Table 1. Design of the study. Dynamic training (DT) Session: the practice-condition received the same 
items as the training condition (x), but without training (T)  
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Means and standard deviations of analogy scores per session and condition 
 
 
 
Table 3. Means and standard deviations of verbal and spatial working memory per condition 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Condition 
        Session 
Pretesting  1 2 DT 3 4 
Practice X x x x x x 
Training X x x T x x 
 Session 
 1 2 3 4 
Condition Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Mean (SD) 
 Complete Solutions (Score range 0-20) 
Practice (N = 52) 4.10 (4.83) 5.6 (5.56) 5.94 (6.28) 6.31 (6.1) 
DT (N = 52) 4.44 (4.33) 6.25 (5.66) 9.38 (5.35) 8.96 (5.61) 
Total (N = 104) 4.27 (4.57) 5.92 (5.59) 7.66 (6.06) 7.63 (5.98) 
 Correct Transformations (Score range 0-110) 
Practice (N = 52) 51.44 (31.99) 53.88 (35.44) 56.71 (37.09) 58.35 (36.8) 
DT (N = 52) 55.88 (28.32) 59.65 (31.97) 78.37 (25.6) 76.08 (26.73) 
Total (N = 104) 53.66 (29.63) 56.77 (33.71) 67.54 (33.53) 67.21 (33.28) 
 Explained Transformations (Score range 0-110) 
Practice (N = 52) 20.29 (21.11) 23.48 (24.2) 22.54 (24.31) 22.13 (22.69) 
DT (N = 52) 23.25 (17.39) 26.98 (21.38) 36.6 (22.25) 32.52 (23.51) 
Total (N = 104) 21.77 (19.31) 25.23 (22.79) 29.57 (24.24) 27.33 (23.56) 
 AWMA Verbal AWMA Spatial 
Condition Mean (SD) Mean (SD) 
Practice (N = 52) 28.29 (10.61) 47.38 (22.90) 
DT (N = 52) 27.38 (8.96) 49.69 (24.20) 
Total (N = 104) 27.84 (9.78) 23.47 (23.47) 
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Table 7. Subgroups of children based on the variables condition, spatial working memory and initial 
variability 
 
 
Note. 1Group codes are based on condition: 0 = repeated practice, 1 = training; spatial working memory: 0 
= lower, 1 = higher; initial variability: 0 = low, 1 = high. 
 
 
 
 
Group Code1 000 001 010 011 111 110 101 100 
Condition 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 
Spatial working memory  0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 
Initial variability 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 
Number of children  20 7 11 14 17 9 8 18 
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 Table 4. Results of multilevel modeling with predictors of the intercept and slope of the number of complete analogies  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note. Significance codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1. Deviance, AIC, and BIC statistics were assessed to compare the relative goodness-of-fit of the 
successive models. 
 
  
 M0 M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 M7 M8 
Fixed Effects          
Intercept 6.370*** 4.593*** 4.573*** -1.213  -0.574 -0.776 1.063 1.078 1.086 
Time  1.185*** 0.902*** 0.897*** -0.368*** 0.131 0.051 0.036 -0.155 
Train   5.412*** 5.428*** 5.417*** 4.652** 5.407*** 5.413*** 6.312*** 
Time x Train   -1.454*** -1.452*** -1.429*** -1.452 -1.449*** -1.460*** -1.470*** 
WMV    0.050 0.034 0.034 -0.060* -0.056* -0.064* 
WMS    0.091*** 0.086*** 0.090*** 0.034** 0.034** 0.035** 
Time x WMV     0.028* 0.028. 0.031* 0.026** 0.038** 
Time x WMS     0.009 - - - - 
Condition x WMV      0.008 - - - 
Condition x WMS      0.011 - - - 
Initial performance       7.933*** 7.707*** 8.125*** 
Time x Initial performance         0.355 - 
Condition x Initial performance         -1.858** 
Variance Components          
Within-person (Residual) 
In initial status  
7.98 
24.82 
3.82 
20.32 
3.28 
20.69 
3.28 
16.42 
3.28 
16.39 
3.28 
16.38 
3.28 
4.21 
3.28 
4.20 
3.15 
4.38 
In rate of change   1.10 1.01 1.01 0.87 0.90 0.92 0.90 0.98 
Goodness-of-fit          
Deviance 2315 2161 2118 2094 2085 2088 1968 1967 1961 
AIC 2320 2173 2134 2114 2109 2114 1992 1993 1987 
BIC  2333 2197 2166 2154 2157 2166 2040 2045 2040 
Number of Parameters 3 6 8 10 12 13 12 13 13 
   
53 
 
 
 
  
Table 5.  Results of multilevel modeling with predictors of the intercept and slope of the number of correct transformations 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note. Significance codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1. Deviance, AIC, and BIC statistics were assessed to compare the relative goodness-of-fit of the 
successive models. 
  
 M0 M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 M7 M8 
Fixed Effects          
Intercept 60.670*** 53.296*** 53.680*** 21.511* 26.264* 22.189* 25.956*** 25.855*** 24.721*** 
Time  4.916*** 2.283* 2.239* -1.812 2.238* 2.286* 2.388* 2.287* 
Train   25.400*** 25.402*** 25.409*** 22.333** 25.400*** 25.384*** 32.745*** 
Time x Train   -4.450* -4.369* -4.383* -4.467* -4.451 -4.439* -4.45* 
WMV    0.267 0.154 0.238 - - - 
WMS    0.510a 0.477*** 0.512* 0.156c 0.156. 0.159. 
Time x WMV     0.096 - - - - 
Time x WMS     0.028 - - - - 
Condition x WMV      0.137 - - - 
Condition x WMS      -0.017 - - - 
Initial performance       45.527*** 45.757*** 47.987*** 
Time x Initial performance        -0.241 - 
Condition x Initial performance         -15.334*** 
Variance Components          
Within-person (Residual) 
In initial status  
207.90 
909.50 
99.72 
893.11 
81.55 
907.45 
81.56 
780.08 
81.56 
778.10 
81.73 
779.48 
81.55 
322.01 
81.55 
322.00 
76.11 
330.26 
In rate of change   40.71 37.22 37.21 35.78 36.70 37.22 37.20 38.27 
Goodness-of-fit          
Deviance 3704 3587 3531 3512 3509 3511 3425 3424.7 3408 
AIC 3710 3599.0 3546.8 3532 3533 3535 3445 3446.7 3430 
BIC  3722 3623.2 3579.0 3572 3581 3583 3485 3491.0 3474 
Number of Parameters 3 6 8 10 12 12 10 11 11 
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Table 6. Results of multilevel modeling with predictors of the intercept and slope of the number of explained transformations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note. Significance codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1. Deviance, AIC, and BIC statistics were assessed to compare the relative goodness-of-fit of the 
successive models. 
 
 
 
 M0 M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 M7 M8 
Fixed Effects          
Intercept 25.974*** 22.822*** 22.742*** -1.596 -1.544 -1.631 4.079 4.103 3.985 
Time  2.101*** 1.043 1.050 0.894 1.040 1.044 0.986 1.054 
Train   20.456*** 20.512*** 20.535*** 22.029*** 20.452*** 20.456*** 23.815*** 
Time x Train   -5.515*** -5.548*** -5.594*** -5.526*** -5.514*** -5.521*** -5.538*** 
WMV    0.286 0.273 0.285 - - - 
WMS    0.338*** 0.344*** 0.285*** 0.116* 0.116* 0.114* 
Time x WMV     0.038 - - - - 
Time x WMS     -0.018 - - - - 
Condition x WMV      0.090 - - - 
Condition x WMS      -0.086 - - - 
Initial performance       29.474*** 29.416*** 29.838*** 
Time x Initial performance        0.138 - 
Condition x Initial performance         -6.968* 
Variance Components          
Within-person (Residual) 
In initial status  
95.11 
417.16 
60.21 
363.13 
52.22 
368.50 
52.22 
293.11 
52.19 
293.07 
52,23 
293.39 
52.22 
117.58 
52.22 
117.58 
50.60 
119.62 
In rate of change   16.53 15.77 15.78 15.52 15.25 15.77 15.77 16.31 
Goodness-of-fit          
Deviance 3379 3317 3278 3257 3258 3254 3175 3175 3169 
AIC 3385 3329 3294 3277 3280 3279 3195 3197 3191 
BIC  3397 3353 3326 3317 3324 3327 3236 3242 3236 
Number of Parameters 3 6 8 10 12 12 10 11 11 
